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INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes Chinese investment in the financial technology (fintech) sector in Indonesia, 
which ranges from payment systems to lending to wealth management. It will specifically 
address fintech lending both by Chinese investors and their domestic partners as a major source 
of controversy in Indonesia. It elaborates on how Chinese investors respond to the evolving 
regulatory environment in Indonesia and addresses local debates over the intentions and 
structure of Chinese investors in the Indonesian fintech sector, comparing those debates to the 
actual situation of Chinese FDI in Indonesia. 
In spite of the controversy facing Chinese investment in Indonesian fintech, especially in the 
area of payday loans, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the problems with the 
industry are the result of Chinese investment bringing bad business practices and governance 
to Indonesia. Instead, the problems can be explained by the nature of the industry, Indonesia’s 
rapidly expanding middle class, and regulators that must react to problems as they arise rather 
than controlling innovation to allow the market to meet consumer needs. 
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INDUSTRY OVERVIEW AMIDST THE EVOLVING 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
A. A Growing Middle Class and A Legging Traditional Financial Sector
Despite large data discrepancies that make it difficult to measure, it is safe to assume that Chinese 
foreign direct investment in Indonesia has been growing significantly. Indonesia’s Investment 
Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal, or BKPM) announced that Indonesia 
received $2.7 billion1 in foreign direct investment from China in 2016. When FDI from Hong Kong 
is included, this figure rises to an unprecedented $4.9 billion. In 2017, China overtook Japan and 
now trails only Singapore on the BKPM list of Southeast Asian countries investing in Indonesia. 
Although China’s investment fell to $2.4 billion in 2018, behind Singapore ($9.2 billion) and Japan 
($4.9 billion), BKPM did not include investment from Hong Kong ($2 billion) in this figure, and a 
significant amount of Singaporean investment is assumed to have originated from China (van der 
Eng, 2018).
Chinese investment occurred in the electricity sector, where it funded the construction of 
power plants and supporting facilities, such as ports, and increased in Indonesia’s downstream 
industries, mainly nickel smelters. Much of this investment is related to China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative and both governments have agreed to joint infrastructure projects in three Indonesian 
provinces specifically designated for Belt and Road investment: North Sumatra, North Kalimantan 
and North Sulawesi. But there is a third sector in which private Chinese companies 
have invested heavily and which draws considerable attention in Indonesia: 
financial technologies, or fintech. These businesses are dominated by electronic/
digital payment (e-payment) systems and online/digital lending, popularly known in 
Indonesia as “fintech lending”. 
In addition to these two major fintech sub-sectors, major fintech players operate to 
a lesser extent in the financial marketplace,2 artificial intelligence (AI), big data for 
financial services (e.g., credit scoring), and wealth management (including robo-
advisory). Fintech has flourished in Indonesia, especially since 2016, in part because 
Indonesia’s more traditional financial industry cannot keep up with the growth of 
the middle class and its increasing demand for technology-based services. 
On one hand, digital adoption is growing at a rapid rate. The majority of Indonesia’s almost 270 
million citizens are under the age of 35, and a study by We are Social in 2019 shows that the total 
number of active internet users in Indonesia reached 150 million, 56% of the total population, 
with 13% annual growth in users from 2017 to 2018. Mobile internet (smartphone) penetration is 
also high in Indonesia (We Are Social and Hoot Suite, 2019). A study from Morgan Stanley shows
1   Unless otherwise specified, all dollar amounts are in United States dollars
2 The financial marketplace here refers to the platform through which financial products including insurance, mutual funds, credit 
cards, and personal loans from banks are sold.
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that Indonesia’s smartphone penetration steadily rose from 28% in 2014 to 54% in 2017, which 
is similar to China’s at 52% in 2014, and double India’s level in 2017 (Morgan Stanley, 2019). An 
estimated 60% of the adult population owns a smartphone and the total number of active mobile 
internet users reached 142.8 million in 2019, representing 53% of the total population (We Are 
Social and Hoot Suite, 2019).In a recent Boston Consulting Group survey (Morgan Stanley, 2019), 
88 million people—35% of the population—were designated as middle-class, affluent consumers 
who regularly spend more than $140 per month on food, utilities, communications, and regular 
household supplies. By 2020, this number is expected to reach 141 million, or 53% of the country.
On the other hand, penetration by the traditional financial sector is lacking. The 2018 World 
Bank Findex Report shows that only 49% of Indonesian adults have savings accounts with a 
bank (World Bank, 2018), is an increase from 2014 when the survey found only 36% of adults 
had savings accounts. In a market with nearly 270 million people, approximately 17 million 
credit cards were held in Indonesia in March 2019, up only slightly from 2012, when about 14 
million were in circulation. These approximately 17 million cards are held by approximately 
10–11 million individuals, only 6% of the total adult population. Financial access touch points 
between customers and traditional financial institutions are also lagging behind demand, in part 
because Indonesia’s archipelagic nature makes it challenging to service all geographic locations. 
There are only about 38,000 bank branches, about 109,000 ATM machines, and around 500,000 
merchants that can accept card payments (Indonesia Fintech Association, 2018).
All of these conditions in the Indonesian financial market are signs that the country needs 
more efficient financial products (whether for saving, payment, or loans) that are cardless and 
branchless—in other words, less physical and more digital. The best way to accomplish this is 
by leveraging smartphone penetration. The strong appetite for consumption among the middle 
class has been fueled by easy access to online loans and aggressive marketing behavior of 
payment platforms. Fintech companies looking to expand in Southeast Asia would be remiss if 
they were to overlook Indonesia scene as a potential market. 
Despite the bullish fintech market, fintech in Indonesia has a negative public image. In March 
2018, Wimboh Santoso, the newly appointed Chairman of the Indonesian Financial Services 
Authority (OJK)3  for the first time raised the issue of addressing through regulation the ultra-high
interest rates of 1–2% per day at which some fintech lenders offer cash payday loans. From July
3 The government agency that oversees Indonesia’s financial services industry and grants registration and licenses for fintech 
lending businesses.
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through December 2018, a series of protests and mass rallies throughout cities in Indonesia 
attacked fintech payday lenders for these interest rates and the aggressive way in which they 
offer some services. The claim is that fintech lenders that offer payday loans exploit the absence 
of adequate interest rate regulations and insufficient price transparency rules.
Most protests targeted fintech lenders that are not registered with OJK, although a handful of 
registered fintech payday lenders were also targeted. In December 2018, the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Foundation, a reputable legal assistance organization, compiled a list of violations (CNN 
Indonesia, 2018) committed by fintech payday lenders. These included:
• Charging an ultra-high interest rate of 1–2% per day
• Insufficient pricing transparency (hidden fees and penalties)
• Changing business names without properly notifying consumers
• Lack of proper registered address and contact number
• Poor administrative and record keeping systems (which meant that compliant 
customers were accused of default) 
• Accessing sensitive personal data in customers’ mobile phones (including contact 
list)
• Using the borrower’s contact list to make calls and otherwise reach out to contacts 
without the borrower’s consent
• Threats and persecution during the collection process
The aggressiveness of personal data collection and use by fintech payday 
lending firms can be attributed primarily to the lack of a reliable system to 
provide credit scores or equivalent information about Indonesians. Indonesia 
has weak credit reporting infrastructure and only around 10% of adult 
Indonesians have credit data recorded at OJK’s central financial repository 
system, SLIK (previously known as BI Checking). These data were developed 
through contributions by approximately 1,600 licensed financial institutions 
in Indonesia that used consumer credit reports from sources such as credit 
card payment records, mortgage defaults, and consumer loans. Because there 
is no way to reliably check creditworthiness, many people go to a bank or 
other financial institution to get a loan but their application is rejected when 
they cannot prove their creditworthiness. In response, consumers may decide 
to seek out unlicensed or unregistered (fintech) lenders in spite of their 
higher interest rates. Fintech lenders employ alternative (non-SLIK) data for 
underwriting, ID verification, address verification, income prediction, spending 
habits, and (if a client is seeking a business loan) merchant analytics. Fintech 
firms operating in retail payment and consumer lending may claim to around 
3,000 data points for their credit assessment. These include:
• Identity and location : fraud-proof identity, location, gender, education;
• Behavioral  : browser history, footprints, cookies, interaction of apps;
• Financial  : deposits, withdrawal;
• Technical  : operating system, browser, hardware;
• Social Media : social graph, sentiment analysis;
• E-commerce : consumption pattern;
• Repayment records : punctuality.
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In short, fintech payday lenders are operating in a space whereby the requirements are still 
evolving and public and semi-public institutions are still taking shape. The issuance of OJK 
Regulation No. 77 of 2016 in December 2016 was meant to facilitate innovation in the new 
sub-sector of financial services. In contrast to the banking regulations, for example, to date 
there is not yet any requirement on interest rate, pricing and information disclosure, as well 
on collection standards. There is also no specific prohibition to lend money without license – 
as opposed to doing banking activities (deposit-taking) that are strictly prohibited if carried out 
without license and subject to criminal sanction. The institution of credit sharing information 
currently managed by OJK as the state regulator and possible access by licensed credit bureaus 
are also not yet established. All of these governance situations, in turn, enable fintech operators 
to grow their business at the expense of consumers. A recent review of consumer protection law 
and policy in Indonesia by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
concluded that Indonesia’s consumer protection system needs to address emerging issues with 
e-commerce and data protection. The review concluded that general provisions exist in the Law 
No.19/2016 on electronic information and transactions but “specific laws on data protection, 
data sovereignty and other issues have yet to be formulated and certain standards applied 
across all sectors” (UNCTAD, 2019). The blueprint of Indonesia’s central bank (Bank Indonesia) 
for Indonesia’s Payment Systems (IPS) 2025 includes the protection of consumer data as one of 
its five principles. Working groups were established in early 2019 that aim to create a regulatory 
framework that determines what financial information can be shared, what information was 
private, and what method would be used to share information (Harsono, 2019).
B. Concerns about Chinese involvement in Indonesian Fintech
One of the key issues raised by consumer groups is that personal data protection has been 
unable to keep up with fintech developments, leading to data abuse by some fintechs. These 
abuses included using the borrower’s contact data to call close relatives for repayment without 
the consent of the borrower or the borrower’s relative. Collection calls were problematic not only 
because of the misuse of data but because of the behavior of these debt collectors, which in the 
case of several companies was reported as aggressive.
Central to the heated public debate in Indonesia and major controversy 
surrounding fintech payday loans is the association of this particular 
business model with Chinese-controlled companies. During the second 
half of 2018, OJK noted that the arrival of predominantly Chinese fintech 
lenders, which often did not register at OJK and employed aggressive 
debt collection practices, started to alarm the regulator. 
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Central to the heated public debate in Indonesia and major controversy surrounding fintech 
payday loans is the association of this particular business model with Chinese-controlled 
companies. During the second half of 2018, OJK noted that the arrival of predominantly 
Chinese fintech lenders, which often did not register at OJK and employed aggressive debt
collection practices, started to alarm the regulator. It produced a blacklist of 2224  banned fintech 
lenders in July 2018 and continuously updated the list until April 2019, when the total number of 
banned apps reached 947.5  In early January 2019, the cybercrime unit of the Indonesian National 
Police Force (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, “Republic of Indonesia State Police” or POLRI) 
arrested three employees working for a Chinese-owned fintech payday lender for aggressive 
debt collection behavior amounting to online threats and harassments. 
Whether protests of fintech payday lending were the result of a problem with lending regulations 
and practices or of underlying anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia, they shed a critical light on 
Chinese fintech investment. An appropriate response requires finding the root problems that 
need to be addressed. Are Chinese fintech payday loan providers importing unethical business 
practices that harm Indonesians, and if so does this provide evidence of the claim that Chinese 
capital undermines democratic governance in other countries? Is this investment a move 
coordinated by the Chinese government or were decisions made by largely autonomous Chinese 
businesses attracted by opportunities in the Indonesian market?
4 Previously 227, but five were later excluded because they were found to be licensed financial institutions. 
5 Based on official data released by OJK. See further discussion on Section C5.
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FINTECH LANDSCAPE IN INDONESIA
A. Fintech Regulatory Landscape
“Financial technology” or “fintech” simply refers to the use of technology to deliver financial 
services. It can encompass almost every technological development in financial services, 
including traditional wire transfer, automated teller machines (ATMs), electronic data capture 
(EDC) devices, and digital banking mobile application. 
However, recent public discussion of the term “fintech” refers to new start-ups and 
established technology companies that have begun to deliver financial products and 
services directly to businesses and consumers. This new model is different because 
it no longer treats technology companies as the “technology vendors” of financial 
institutions. Fintech in Indonesia has been a combination of international, regional, 
and local technology players that can either be independent entrepreneurs like local 
unicorns6  such as Go-Jek, the ride-hailing company, or part of larger groups as in the 
case of a local subsidiary of Chinese firms such as Alipay. 
The emergence of direct offerings from technology companies has necessitated the 
creation of a new form of licensing and compliance to compensate for the fact that the 
conventional business model classification does not fit with the new structure. Within 
the financial industry a division has emerged between “the incumbent”, or traditional 
financial institutions (e.g., banks, insurance companies, investment banks, consumer 
financing companies), and “the challenger”, or non-traditional financial institutions 
(e.g., e-money, e-wallet, peer-to-peer/marketplace lending). In this paper, the term 
“fintech” refers to new business models that were previously unregulated but recently 
introduced to accommodate new products, services, offerings, or business models. 
This scope and definition, admittedly, will not capture all fintech features. For example, Akulaku 
Finance Indonesia, the number one fintech lender in Indonesia by transaction volume (loans 
disbursed), is not technically a fintech lending company because it is registered under the 
traditional consumer/multi-financing license, but the way it provides credit and uses alternative 
digital data for credit scoring mirrors exactly the operation of consumer fintech lenders 
registered as fintech at OJK. Digibank from the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) is legally 
a bank because it is the product of a licensed banking institution, but uses digital innovation and 
operates like a fintech in everything from consumer credit assessment to personal financial 
management. Therefore, a case-by-case approach is important to understanding the fintech 
market. It is a combination of new business models, services, and products that are offered by 
emerging entities. 
6 Private startup companies valued at $1 billion or more. Unicorns are discussed further in part D of this paper. 
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Regulatory institutions in Indonesia have responded to the development of new business models 
and new services such as peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, e-wallets, or payment gateways. The 
main regulators are OJK as the financial services regulator, the central bank of Indonesia (Bank 
Indonesia, or BI) as payments regulator, and the Ministry of Communication and Information 
Technology (the ICT ministry, Kominfo). Table 1 outlines the basic regulatory and institutional 
framework for fintech in Indonesia. 
Regulatory institutions in Indonesia have responded to the development 
of new business models and new services such as peer-to-peer (P2P) 
lending, e-wallets, or payment gateways. The main regulators are 
OJK as the financial services regulator, the central bank of Indonesia 
(Bank Indonesia, or BI) as payments regulator, and the Ministry of 
Communication and Information Technology (the ICT ministry, Kominfo). 
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B. Fintech Business Models and the Regulatory Framework
As noted above, fintech can refer to various business models subject to different regulatory 
authorities. Table 2 and Figure 1 further detail each business model as defined by the respective 
regulatory framework.
Table 2.
Business Models, Prevalence, and Registration
At the time of writing, none licensed by OJK, based on 
association data of companies already applying or 
intending to apply to OJK
A mix of regulated entities, such as licensed innovative 
insurance brokers, insurance marketplaces, and new 
insurtech business models registered at OJK Innovation 
Hub
Registered at OJK Fintech Lending Departments106 companiesLending
Registered at both BI and OJK61 companiesPayment




























1. Fintech Regulatory Landscape
Fintech lending has been emerging as a popular business model since OJK introduced OJK 
Regulation No. 77 on Online Money Lending and Borrowing at the end of 2016, which came fully 
into force in the first quarter of 2017. As of April 2019, 106 companies were registered. 
Before this regulation was enacted, companies operated with needing approval to lend money. 
During this time, unregulated businesses attracted approximately 14,000 lenders, 38,000 
borrowers, and dealt with IDR 284 billion ($20 million) in loan disbursements. With the regulations 
enacted at the end of 2017, the number of lenders reached around 100,000, borrowers 259,000, 
and loan disbursements reached IDR 2.56 trillion ($179 million). It took about one year for players 
in this space (including major ones from China) to obtain the necessary registration and set up 
their operations, and as such the industry started to pick up in 2018. As of February 2019, the 
number of lenders have reached around 245,000, there were around 6 million borrowers, and 
IDR 28 trillion ($2 billion) was being disbursed in loans (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 2019).
OJK Regulation No. 77/2016 defines “fintech lending” as a marketplace that connects lenders and 
borrowers on a peer-to-peer platform”.7 Under this understanding of fintech, as it was originally 
envisioned by the regulators, the “marketplace” feature allows fintechs to match borrowers with 
lenders and lenders decide to whom they would like to make loans, what is often referred to as 
P2P lending. This regulatory framing does not allow fintechs to maintain the types of portfolios 
or funding pools used by more traditional financial institutions, such as deposit accounts to back 
loans, returns from investments, or fees for services such as insurance, to finance loans—they 
only act as “matchers” between borrowers and lenders.  
In reality, as the middle class has developed and the need for more diverse loan providers has 
spurred innovation, the traditional version of fintech has not been able to meet consumer needs. 
OJK has been flexible about allowing fintech to develop new tools to meet these challenges. 
7 Article 1 of OJK Regulation No. 77/2016 on Online Money Lending and Borrowing.
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Because there are cases in which much smaller loans are needed immediately, fintechs have 
developed the “super-lender” model  for meeting the needs of the market. Under the super-
lender model,8 a fintech lending platform sets up a subsidiary business to pool funds from 
investors or lenders, obtains authorization from those lenders to manage their funds, and then 
treats this subsidiary as a lender that can be matched with borrowers in order to make the types 
of loans that are impossible under traditional fintech borrower-lender matching. Because the 
fintech itself, rather than the lenders, helps to find borrowers and makes the lending decision, 
the distinction between a fintech lending platform and a bank or consumer financing company 
becomes blurred. 
The development of the super-lender model to service borrowers left behind 
by traditional fintech models has resulted in the development of products 
beyond those originally envisioned by regulators. Although small business 
and microfinancing loans can be facilitated simply by matching lenders 
to borrowers, consumer loans and payday loans usually require nearly 
instantaneous assessment and approval, which requires that the fintech 
platform have the means and authority to approve and disburse the funds. 
As a result, the development of super-lenders has allowed the creation of 
two additional product categories and there are now four types of products 
offered by fintech lenders: (i) Small-medium enterprise (SME) marketplaces, 
(ii) microfinance marketplaces, (iii) consumer loans, and (iv) cash payday loans. 
The key features of each product are as follows:
(i)  SME lending marketplace
• Loans of up to IDR 2 billion (roughly $140,000) for productive purposes
• A more traditional fintech market matches borrowers and lenders 
• Varieties include invoice financing, online seller financing, and merchant 
cash advances
• Interest rates are competitive and comparable to those offered by traditional 
financial institutions 
(ii)  Microfinance marketplace
• Loans of up to IDR 25 million (roughly $1,600) for productive purposes
• A more traditional fintech market matches borrowers and lenders
• These loans are typically the result of a combination of social entrepreneurship 
and community empowerment programs, including for targeted segments 
such as farmers, fishers, or rural micro entrepreneurs
• Interest rates are competitive and comparable to those offered by traditional 
financial institutions
(iii)  Consumer loans 
• Personal / consumer loans of up to IDR 25 million (roughly $1,600) for 
consumption purposes
7 Also called the “limited standby lender” model. 
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• Repayment is made in installments
• Requires instant approval, therefore funding comes from a super-lender
• Includes loans to finance purchases of goods, education loans, and property 
loans
• Interest rates are competitive and comparable to those offered by credit card 
companies
(iv)  Payday Loans 
• Micro consumer loan up to IDR 2 million (roughly $140) for consumption 
purposes, disbursed in cash
• Repayment in full at the end of the month
• Requires instant approval, therefore funding comes from a super-lender
• High interest rate, up to 2% per day, although OJK is exploring legal options 
to reduce the rate gradually
Out of 106 companies registered with OJK in April 2019, payday and consumer loans products 
make up 31 and 28 companies, respectively. SME lending marketplaces account for 27 companies, 
whereas 19 companies are micro-finance marketplaces. Figure 2 outlines the representation of 
each model among the companies registered with OJK.
Figure 2.











Because credit cards are so rare, fintechs have filled the gap. E-payments are a 
substitute for card payments that are available to far more merchants and consumers 
because they are cheaper and more flexible. E-payments is another sub-sector of 
digital finance that is ripe for disruption. 
E-payments encompasses e-money (an interest free, deposit-taking9 payment 
instrument), e-wallet (digital interface platform of payment instruments), payment 
gateway (a service that allows merchants to accept different payment methods), 
and to a certain extent, remittances. E-payments is an area to which both banks and 
non-banks (fintechs and telecommunications companies) can cater. For example, 
there are 38 e-money license holders, consisting of 18 fintechs, 16 banks, and 4 
telecommunications operators. 
As of April 2019, there are 61 fintech payment companies (non-bank, non-telecommunications) 
registered at Bank Indonesia, consisting of 18 e-money operators (two of which hold a double 
license that allows them to also operate e-wallets), 11 payment gateways, and 42 payment 
system companies applying other payment business models but have been registered at BI 
Fintech Office. 
Indonesia’s rapid adoption of e-money is led by fintechs. After doubling transaction value in 2017, 
e-money quadrupled transaction value to IDR 47.2 trillion ($3.4 billion) in 2018. This is similar to 
the surge in e-money adoption seen in China in 2016. Based on analysis by Morgan Stanley (2019), 
Indonesia’s e-money transaction share of non-cash transactions (i.e., credit cards, debit cards, 
and e-money) jumped from 1.3% in 2016 to 2.1% in 2017 and 7.3% in 2018, putting Indonesia at a 
similar level to India, where mobile payments grew from a 6.4% share in 2014 to a 10.9% share 
in 2015. In December 2018, e-money transactions reached an all-time high of 9.2% market share 
in non-cash transactions, almost triple its level in December 2017 (3.5%).
Non-banks dominate the digital payment sector. BI data in April 2019 shows that there are 113 
million user accounts for non-banks (65%) compared to 60 million user accounts for banks (35%). 
However, 99% of non-bank users are digital products (digital wallet or digital money), whereas 
bank-based e-money is card-based, mostly used for public transportation (e.g., bus, toll roads, 
subway) and so is technically not “digital” (CNN Indonesia, 2019). Therefore, it is safe to conclude 
that 99% of mobile phone-based digital payment is facilitated by fintechs rather than banks.
9  In other words, a prepaid payment instrument.
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These fintechs include Go-Pay (of the ride-sharing company Go-Jek), OVO (developed by Lippo 
Group, now closely partnering with the ride-sharing company Grab), DANA (a joint venture 
between Ant Financial/Alipay with a local business group), and T-Cash (previously Telkomsel, a 
telecommunications operator, now spun off as a separate fintech). 
In terms of adoption, Go-Jek is leading with a gross transaction value  of $9 billion, while Go-
Pay reached $6.3 billion in 2018 (CNBC Indonesia, 2019). OVO, Go-pay’s main competitor, did not 
disclose its transaction values but did disclose that it processed around 1 billion transactions 
in 2018 (Katadata.co.id, 2018). Fintech is conquering digital payment for the following reasons: 
• Rapid growth among offline merchants since mid-2018, especially since Go-Pay, 
DANA, and OVO opened their platforms for offline purchase;
• Online food ordering and online transportation from ride hailing apps (Go-Jek and 
Grab);
• Discounts and promotions, with fintechs offering up to 60% discounts for retail 
transactions;
• New distribution networks created by fintechs for balance top-up, that is, cash 
deposits through motorcycle drivers (Grab and Go-Jek) or traditional kiosks 
(warung) managed by e-commerce platforms (Bukalapak and Tokopedia, both 
Indonesian unicorn startups) that allow customers without internet access to place 
orders and receive products at kiosks and offer digital goods such as internet data, 
electricity tokens, and online game vouchers. 
Finally, it is important to note that market penetration by these local payment instruments is 
distinct from potential penetration of foreign payment products. For example, DANA is an Alipay 
joint venture, but Alipay can also operate directly to allow its Chinese customers to use their 
Alipay app in Indonesia. In spite of their joint ownership, DANA and Alipay are subject to different 
requirements. For Alipay (the Chinese brand) to cater to the Chinese visitors in Indonesia, BI 
requires Alipay (or WeChat pay, or any company) to partner with Indonesian banks with core 
capital of at least Rp30tn.
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3. Other Registered Businesses 
The remaining types of businesses among those registered by OJK are briefly described in 
Table 3. 
Table 3.
Other Business Types Registered with OJK
Financial marketplace
(19 companies)
A platform to connect companies raising funds to retail 
investors in exchange of equity ownership 
Equity crowdfunding
(5 companies)
Companies dedicated to innovations that support the insurance 
sector, including digital insurance marketplaces or exchanges, 
claim handling, crowd-insurance, and telematics
Insurtech 
(6 companies)
Companies dedicated to innovations that support the insurance 
sector, including digital insurance marketplaces or exchanges, 
claim handling, crowd-insurance, and telematics
Miscellaneous
(19 companies)
Includes AI and big data for credit scoring, e-KYC providers, and 




C. How Regulations are Catching Up with Fintech Innovations
Several studies argue that “many forms of capital emanating from authoritarian 
nations are having a corrosive effect on democratic institutions and private 
enterprise in recipient countries” (CIPE, 2018) by taking advantage of the weak 
regulatory systems in those recipient countries. 
In the financial sector, the exploitation of weak regulatory systems has been 
attributed not only to the origins of foreign capital in countries with poor institutions, 
but also to the new and arguably disruptive fintech business models. Around the 
world there are two leading ideas that attempt to explain the shift to alternative 
fintech: an increased regulatory burden on traditional financial institutions and the 
emergence of new technology (Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, & Seru, 2017). Both of 
these factors directly affect the governance of the financial industry, especially 
when the structure of regulatory supervision is not well integrated and when the 
law governing emerging, data-driven technology is not properly defined. 
Beginning in 2017 and picking up in 2018, the market for financial consumer products in 
Indonesia has undergone a dramatic change. Intermediation has shifted away from traditional 
banks to alternative online lending platforms. The explanatory narrative is that conventional 
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the exploitation of weak 
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financial institutions are subject to an ever-increasing regulatory burden, heightened legal 
scrutiny, and larger capital requirements, all of which have affected the products they can 
provide and increased the cost of providing them. As a result, traditional institutions, especially 
those facing tighter capital constraints, are withdrawing from markets with high regulatory costs 
and alternative fintech lenders step in to fill this gap.
The exponential growth of fintech lending has outpaced the speed of regulatory adaptation. 
Alternative fintech operators have interpreted and complied with the existing regulations 
in ways that deviate from the conventional business practices the regulators anticipated. 
Their “creative compliance” ensures minimum efficient regulatory fulfillment. To the 
incumbents, these practices look like exploitation of legal loopholes that advantage new 
businesses over traditional firms.
Navigating licensing requirements is an integral part of developing new, disruptive business 
models. It is not specific to the financial sector in Indonesia, but has occurred around the 
world across various sectors. For example, ride-hailing companies such as Uber have 
faced challenges in different jurisdictions regarding whether their businesses constitute 
a taxi service that requires transportation license, or merely a matching platform that connects 
drivers with riders. There are also major questions about the status of their drivers and whether 
they are qualified as employees who must be provided with statutory labor benefits or not. In the 
hospitality industry, room-sharing platforms such as Airbnb have been facing similar challenges 
regarding whether their business operations should require them to obtain hotel licenses. Both 
of these cases closely mirror Indonesia’s fintechs and their borrower-lender matching models. 
Several examples of creative compliance are prominent in fintech lending. Before the introduction 
of OJK Regulation 77/2016, companies offering consumer financing were required to obtain 
a consumer financing institution (perusahaan pembiayaan) license in order to perform online 
(direct on-balance sheet) lending. The minimum paid-up capital for this license is IDR 100 billion. 
The introduction of OJK 77/2016 enables companies to obtain a fintech lending registration 
with minimum paid-up capital of IDR 2.5 billion. The downside of fintech lending registration as 
opposed to consumer financing institution registration is that fintech lending can only be used 
to perform matching platform functions, not direct lending. In practice, many fintech lenders 
(including all fintech payday lenders) easily circumvent this restriction by using the “super-
lender” model. By doing so, they can, de facto, perform direct, on-balance sheet lending with a 
much lower minimum capital of IDR 2.5 billion. 
The introduction of OJK 77/2016 enables companies to obtain a fintech 
lending registration with minimum paid-up capital of IDR 2.5 billion. 
The downside of fintech lending registration as opposed to consumer 
financing institution registration is that fintech lending can only be used to 
perform matching platform functions, not direct lending. In practice, many 
fintech lenders (including all fintech payday lenders) easily circumvent 









Another example is the case of “virtual credit cards”. Before the introduction of OJK Regulation 
77/2016, companies offering credit cards needed to be licensed banks or consumer financing 
institutions (perusahaan pembiayaan), then obtain a card-issuance license from Bank Indonesia, 
known as an APMK (Alat Pembayaran Menggunakan Kartu) license. As transactions move online, 
and even as transactions in the physical world stop requiring a physical card (substituting 
technology such as QR payments), APMK licenses are becoming less relevant and may become 
obsolete. This, again, creates a regulatory advantage for fintech companies over credit card 
issuers.
Finally, a controversial practice employed by the Chinese-dominated payday lending sector is 
unlimited interest rates on small, high-risk loans. Banks are subject to various requirements 
affecting their interest rate, from the benchmark BI rate to primary reserve requirements. 
This makes many small consumer loans too risky for incumbents to take on. In fintech, on the 
contrary, the interest rate requirements are relatively flexible because the only factor taken into 
consideration is the “agreement” between the lender and the borrower, for which the fintech 
operator merely serves as a platform for facilitation. Interest rates can be as high as 2% per 
day, a rate at which many lenders will happily extend credit, as evidenced by the rapid entry of 
lenders into this market. 
At the time of writing, OJK was considering how and whether to impose an interest rate cap on 
fintech lending of 0.8% per day. Although an interest rate cap is not desirable if it means that 
some people in desperate need of cash cannot get it in time because lenders consider them too 
risky to loan to without high payoffs, the alternative (full interest-rate liberalization) may also hurt 
consumers so desperate for cash that they are not cautious enough to shop around. Further, with 
the lack of pricing transparency (especially on penalties for late repayment), loan values might 
double or triple once defaulted, further exacerbating the already high interest rates, another 
practice that could especially affect the most desperate and vulnerable borrowers. 
Most of the concerns about the lag in regulation are at their root concerns about consumer 
protection. The challenge is to ensure that ride-hailing drivers have undergone proper 
background checks, shared rooms for rent will not disturb the surrounding neighbors, and that 
the financial products offered by a fintech lender to consumers are fair and transparent. In order 
to meet these challenges, it is important to understand that the problem is one of new, disruptive 
industries rather than being country-specific nor industry-specific. 
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CHINA’S FINTECH INVESTMENT IN INDONESIA
A. The Notion of “Control” and Identification of The Flow of Capital
The issue of corporate control is important to understanding the policy environment in which 
fintechs operate in Indonesia. There are several ways to determine who legally controls the 
company. A quantitative measure relies on the control of shares in the company. The standard 
rule is simple majority rule, or 50% +1. However, in some cases, including the case of companies 
listed publicly in Indonesia before 2008,11  the threshold can be set lower so that any person or 
entity controlling as little as 20% or 30% can be considered in control of the company. 
Control can also be measured qualitatively, by the ability to control the management and/or the 
policy of a company. An organization can have a small stake in a company12 but retain control 
through its authority to appoint the board of directors, for example. 
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches to evaluating company control are recognized in 
securities regulations that apply to publicly traded companies  and may be adopted to assess the 
fintech sector. For tech businesses and digital companies, the qualitative approach can be more 
suitable for determining company control even though it is harder to measure. There are many 
instances in which even a small minority stake (below 5%) can retain control of the company, 
especially in venture capital-backed companies that have undergone multiple funding rounds. 
In these cases, the founder typically retains a management control right—for appointing the 
board of directors and board of commissioners—even when their share of the company’s total 
capital has been substantially reduced by the inclusion of new funders. It is also possible for 
a venture capitalist to own majority stakes of a tech company without gaining control. Venture 
capitalists are generally more interested in financial returns from startups than they are in 
controlling the companies in which they invest. They typically have authority in financial decision 
making, including decisions to secure new funding from investments or through a loan, but not 
necessarily management control.
Further, by this definition of control, a nominee structure13  that represents a foreign interest—a 
common model in Indonesian fintech—can be considered way in which control can be exercised. 
This can be shown in the composition of many boards of directors and boards of commissioners, 
which are often mostly local to make it easier to qualify for work permits or qualification 
assessments.14 Strict and thorough assessments by the regulators (OJK or BI) of the identity 
of license applicants prior to the issuance of a business license has made it more difficult to 
use a nominee structure in financial services compared to other sectors. If the parties decide to 
proceed with a nominee arrangement, pursuant to the Indonesian Investment Law of 2007, the 
agreement will be deemed void and the foreign shareholders will have no legal protection in the 
company. They will proceed covering their own risks and liabilities.
11  Bapepam-LK Regulation IX.H.1 governs the takeover of control for publicly listed companies. In IX.H.1 (2008), Bapepam-LK set 
the quantitative concept of control at 50%+1, replacing IX.H.1. (2002), which set it at 25%. In 2012, Bapepam-LK changed its name 
into OJK after merging with a certain supervisory part of Bank Indonesia. 
12 Since 2008, Bapepam IX.H.1 has been amended several times, most recently through OJK Regulation No. 9/P.OJK 04/2018 on 
Takeover of Public Companies.
13  An equity structure in which in which a nominee holds the legal title to shares that benefit another person.
14  To some degree, this acts as a fit-and-proper person test, a tool sometimes used to try to prevent corruption on a board.
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Indonesian financial regulation does not allow 100% foreign ownership in 
fintech. The limit on foreign ownership varies with the business model, from 
85% (for P2P lending) to 49% (for e-money enterprises). Given this restriction, 
within this paper we divide the term control into “exclusive control,” in which 
the controller has exclusive control regardless of whether they work with a 
local partner, and “joint venture” or “shared control,” in which the structure of 
the partnership more resembles an equal arrangement between the foreign 
and the local partner. Shared control occurs in large part because the local 
partner is a considerably larger or more reputable business group with strong 
bargaining power. Exclusive foreign quantitative control of e-money licenses 
is impossible because of the 49% foreign ownership cap, but in online lending 
it is possible to exercise exclusive foreign control through the 85% maximum 
foreign ownership. 
Once control is defined, the next step is to identify the country from which that control is exercised. 
For years, the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) has listed Singapore as the top 
country of origin for foreign investment in Indonesia. Singapore is known as Asia’s business hub 
because capital in-flows from various regions including the United States, Europe, China, India, 
and Southeast Asian regions are aggregated through the country. It is therefore likely that some 
Chinese investment facilitated through Singapore would be officially recorded as investments 
from Singapore rather than as Chinese investment (van der Eng, Chinese Investors in Indonesia 
seem to be Tighthening their Belts, 2018). A study by van der Eng (2018) revealed that in 2015 
Singapore held 51% of the $62.8 billion outward stock of Chinese FDI to ASEAN countries. This is 
almost as much as the $64.7 billion outward stock of Singapore’s FDI in other ASEAN countries 
in 2015. Indonesia hosted 51% of Singapore’s outward stock of FDI that year, it may also be 
the main recipient of Chinese FDI channeled through Chinese subsidiaries located in Singapore 
(Kong & van der Eng, 2017).
The combination of qualitative ownership control, the potential for nominee structure, and 
investments through Singapore, make it impossible to accurately assess the level of foreign 
ownership and control of fintechs operating in Indonesia without access to each company’s 
confidential legal documents. This paper therefore approaches the problem of assessing foreign 
ownership through a deal or transaction basis, relying on disclosed deals and/or in-depth 
interviews with key business insiders conducted by CIPS. 
B. Identifying Deal Size of Unicorns, Independent Fintech Startups, 
and Chinese Subsidiaries
The issue of corporate control is important to understanding the policy environment in which 
fintechs operate in Indonesia. There are several ways to determine who legally controls the 
company. A quantitative measure relies on the control of shares in the company. The standard 
rule is simple majority rule, or 50% +1. However, in some cases, including the case of companies 
listed publicly in Indonesia before 2008,11  the threshold can be set lower so that any person or 
entity controlling as little as 20% or 30% can be considered in control of the company. 
A first attempt to understand Chinese investment in fintech is to divide these companies into 
startups and subsidiary companies (in this case, subsidiaries of a Chinese parent company). 
Indonesian financial 
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on foreign ownership 
varies with the business 
model, from 85% (for 
P2P lending) to 49% (for 
e-money enterprises). 
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Startups are typically portrayed as led by local founders/entrepreneurs trying to implement 
new business models in Indonesia, whereas Chinese subsidiary companies import already 
successful business practices from China to Indonesia. In terms of control, the founding 
team in startups usually retains management control15 even when the majority of shares 
are held by financial investors, while the controlling shares of a Chinese subsidiary remain 
with the Chinese parent company. 
Startups can be further divided into independent fintechs, which usually have a single 
business focus (online lending, e-payment, insurtech, etc.) and unicorn startups, which 
leverage their main, often non-fintech businesses (e-commerce, ride-hailing, or online 
travel) to drive their fintech arms. The unicorns are key players in fintech because they 
attracted the majority of funding and allocated those funds to build their fintech products, 
or acquire fintech companies. 
1. Unicorns
Since 2016, the Indonesian tech ecosystem has been dominated by the rise of the unicorns: 
private companies valued at $1 billion. Unicorns are flourishing in Indonesia, whether home-
grown, such as Go-Jek, Traveloka, Tokopedia, Bukalapak, or regional companies based out of 
Singapore, such as Grab, SEA Group, and Lazada, or China, like JD.com. A recent study by Google 
shows that between 2015 and 2018, total funding raised for unicorn startups in Southeast Asia 
was raised in Singapore (approximately $16 billion) and Indonesia (roughly $6 billion), with the 
remaining $2 billion raised in the rest of Southeast Asia. It is not safe to assume that only $6 
billion of this funding went to the Indonesian market. The same study concludes that almost 80% 
of funds raised went to the unicorns of Southeast Asia (and Indonesia), and that these unicorns 
afterwards invested heavily in Indonesia. Grab, Lazada, and Sea Group (in addition to local 
Indonesian unicorns) have deployed funds to build businesses across the region, including, and 
especially, in Indonesia. 
Unicorns have invested substantial funds into fintech product development. In many cases, these 
products are well-integrated into the company’s main app, although legally they can be part of 
different but affiliated companies. 
Table 4 shows how Chinese funds have played a major role in the establishment and rise of 
seven Southeast Asian unicorns, all of which have substantial fintech operations in Indonesia. 
Underlined companies originated from China.
15 There are some exceptions to this rule, including the acquisition of Lazada by Alibaba.
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Chinese Funds and the Rise of Southeast Asian Unicorns
2016: valued at $1.3 billion and secure over $550 
million from investors including KKR, Warburg 
Pincus, Farallon Capital, and Capital Group Private 
Markets.
2017: valued at $2.5 billion and secures over $1.2 
billion in funding. China Giant, Tencent reportedly 
led this round.
Early 2018: secured another $1.5 billion fund 
injection at a $5 billion valuation, from Google, 
Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, and BlackRock.
October 2018: raised $1.2 billion and sought a 
valuation of $9 billion. Investors are said to 





























Major shareholder is EMTEK, through PT. Kreatif 
Media Karya, holding 36.86% of shares.
Alibaba’s Ant Financial was reported to lead 
Bukalapak funding rounds in 2017.
Another major shareholder is GIC, the Singapore 
government’s investment arm.
January 2019: Bukalapak announced the arrival of 
another key shareholder, Asset-Naver Asia 




































2016: Lazada was acquired by Alibaba
2018: Alibaba’s stake increased to an undisclosed 
size following the latest investment, a 
spokeswoman told Reuters. It held an 83 percent 
stake prior to the investment, which now doubles 







Of these seven unicorns, Lazada is the only company in which the corporate control has changed 
from the original founders to a new, Chinese controller upon its acquisition by Alibaba. Other 
unicorns remain under the management control of their founding teams, but this does not 
diminish the importance of Chinese investments in fueling their growth. As indicated in the 
published transaction deals above, Chinese investors have been active in acquiring financial 
stakes in Indonesia’s and Southeast Asia’s technology giants. 
Chinese investors have been active in acquiring financial stakes 
in Indonesia’s and Southeast Asia’s technology giants. 
2. Independent Fintech
Outside of the unicorn-linked mega deals that fueled the fintech arms of these companies, 
independent fintechs, which are not affiliated with international or local groups, have also 
been attractive targets for investment in Indonesia. Media announcements have revealed that 
fintech startups raised around $280.3 million, of which $170 million went to Akulaku, which 
was founded by an independent Chinese entrepreneur who relocated to Indonesia and secured 
funding from a group of investors led by Alibaba’s Ant Financial. Other significant deals included 
those by Kredivo, a consumer installment platform worth roughly $30 million, Modalku, an SME 
lending marketplace worth roughly $25 million and led by Softbank and Sequoia, and Cekaja, a 
marketplace for bank and insurance products worth roughly $25 million and led by Experian. 
None of the funding for these three companies was led by Chinese companies or investors, 
although some Chinese venture capitalists did participate in the deals. 
3. Chinese Subsidiaries
While Chinese investors into Indonesian unicorns or independent fintech startups are typically not 
able to control these companies, which are generally controlled by their founding team, Chinese 
investors definitely control the operations and management of the subsidiaries of Chinese firms 
in Indonesia. Significant Chinese influence in the Indonesian market originates in internal deals 
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formed by strategic partnerships or the opening up of local subsidiaries by Chinese companies. 
Key China-related transactions are:16 
• Xiaomi’s financial arm, Mi Credit, aggregating financial products for the purchase of 
Xiaomi phones;
• JD Finance Indonesia, a fintech arm of JD.ID, a Chinese e-commerce company;
• The launch of OneConnect Indonesia, the subsidiary of Ping An Group, China’s 
insurance firm and largest consumer finance provider;
• Several key investments by Chinese operators to enter the e-payment market, as 
described below; and
• Several Chinese operators setting up subsidiaries in online lending, as described 
below.
C. Identifying the Control Structure of Fintech Payment 
Companies
A substantial portion of the funding that went to the unicorns was used 
to develop fintech products in Indonesia, although the exact numbers 
are known only to the companies themselves. The same applies to major 
Chinese investments that open e-payment businesses in Indonesia. All 
of these companies have similar strategies when it comes to fintech: 
start with payment products and later build various offering on top of the 
payment platform. 
Digital money and digital wallets are payment products that interact 
directly with users such as retail customers. Table 5 lists the five of 18 
Indonesian companies (28%) that are joint ventures with foreign entities.  
Table 5.
Joint Venture with Foreign Entities
Visionet
A joint venture between EMTEK local conglomerate group with 
Ant Financial that has leveraged Bukalapak’s online outreach 




16 No transaction values have been disclosed for any of these deals.
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A subsidiary of Garena and SEA Group of Singapore. Airpay
Blue Pay
Interestingly enough, three of these five companies are directly linked to China and the remaining 
two are linked to Grab and SEA Group, which although not Chinese-controlled have substantial 
investors from China. Didi Chuxing reportedly invested as much as $2 billion into Grab in 2017 
(Russell, Grab gets $2B from Didi and SoftBank to fuel bid to defeat Uber in Southeast Asia, 
2017), while Tencent owned about 34% of SEA Group through 2017 (Chandler & Barrett, 2018). 
Another company worth mentioning is Go-Pay, which although locally-controlled, has received 
substantial funding from Chinese giants such as Tencent and JD.com, most notably in 2018 
when roughly $1 billion in investment was led by Google, Tencent, and JD.com, but also included 
Meituan Dianping (Potkin, 2019), and in 2017 when roughly $1.2 billion of investment was led 
Tencent, in which Tencent reportedly contributed around $150 million and JD.com $100 million 
(Russell, 2017).
Before 2017, Alipay and Tencent attempted to apply for e-money licensing without local partners 
but had difficulty obtaining regulatory approval. It is not clear whether they would still pursue 
this license given that they eventually managed to secure the license through partnerships with, 
or investment in, local businesses. 
D. Identifying the Control Structure of Fintech Lending Companies 
Fintech lending can be divided into four general products: the SME lending marketplace, 
microfinance marketplace, consumer loans, and cash payday loans. This division allows us to 
see how the country of origin affects which business model a fintech will pursue. For example, 
all fintech lenders in the microfinance marketplace are domestic, while Chinese-controlled 
companies dominate the payday loan market. 
It is also worth noting that the majority of fintech lenders in Indonesia are properly registered 
with the designated authority, OJK. Further, all unregistered fintech lenders were operating 
payday loan businesses.
(a). Registered Fintech Lenders17
Below is our finding based on the controller’s country of origin:     
• The SME lending marketplace is dominated by domestic companies (96%), except 
for one company from Singapore.
17 OJK 77/2016 Regulation recognizes two licensing steps: registration and full license. A company will receive registration status 
and will be given 1-2 years to complete the audit and documentary requirements before being fully licensed. Once registered, 
a company can fully operate as if it is licensed. Therefore, being registered is more of the same of being licensed in terms of 
permitted activities. 
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• All microfinance operators are all locally controlled.
• As illustrated in Figure 3, the ownership and control of consumer loan companies 
are more diverse, but still dominated by domestically controlled businesses (57%), 
whereas four companies are from China and one is a Chinese joint venture. Of the 
four Chinese-controlled companies, three originally planned to offer payday loans, 
but OJK has temporarily suspended the granting of new payday lender registrations 
due to controversies.
Figure 3.











• In payday lending, two-thirds of controlling stakes are either Chinese (61%) or 
Chinese joint ventures (6%), as illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4.
Controlling Shareholder of Fintech Operators Providing











Among the four main product offerings by fintech companies, Chinese-controlled 
companies are only dominant in the payday loan sector. Among offerings for SME 
loan marketplaces, microfinance marketplaces, and consumer loans, the controllers’ 
countries of origin are either balanced or dominated by the domestic businesses. 
The predominance of Chinese control in payday loans compared to other fintech products 
is important because payday loans are the main source of controversy revolving around 
“fintech” in Indonesia. Complaints about fintech tend to be the use of ultra-high interest 
rates, the potential for abuse (non-consensual use) of personal data, and threats and 
persecution during call collection. Rather than assuming these concerns are a product 
of fintech, it’s useful to ask whether these problems are the result of the business 
model used for payday lending or in the controllers’ approach to the Indonesian market, 
which may not be in line with Indonesian business practices.
The top leading platforms by transaction volume and the number of borrowers are all 
payday lenders from China. Below are the top five companies by transaction volume 
through the end of 2018, as ranked according to analysis by the authors through 
interviews, listed in alphabetical order.18  
1. Akulaku, founded by an independent Chinese entrepreneur, William Li, with 
substantial investments from Alipay’s Ant Financial, offering consumer installment 
products;
2. Dana Rupiah (a subsidiary of China-based Weshare Group), offering payday loan 
products;
3. Kredit Pintar (a subsidiary of China-based Advance.AI), offering payday loan 
products;
4. Pendanaan, founded by an independent Chinese entrepreneur, Jasmine Hao Dai, 
offering payday loan products; and
5. Rupiah Plus (recently changed to Perdana), founded by an independent Chinese 
entrepreneur who offers payday loan products.
Akulaku Finance is the number one company by transaction volume, but as discussed earlier 
it is not a fintech company, though it operates in the same way that fintech lenders do. Akulaku 
Finance is a Chinese-controlled company. 
(b). Unregistered / Illegal Fintech Lenders
Starting in June 2018, the spread of improper debt collection practices carried out by fintech 
lenders made national headlines. Only later was it discovered that these practices were largely 
undertaken by fintech operators not registered with OJK (although some registered fintech 
payday lenders have also been caught using such practices). Since that time, OJK has regularly
 
18 Unfortunately, OJK does not publish transaction volume by company for comparison. 
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published a list of unregistered fintech lenders. OJK can only govern and 
supervise business activities under its licensing regime because it relies on 
administrative sanctions on the 106 companies it has recognized as registered 
entities for enforcement. OJK lacks the tools and the authority to act against 
unregistered entities. Almost all unregistered apps conducted payday loans, 
which by their nature (immediate, cash loans under $140 offered at a high 
interest rate) target the poorer population, who receive minimum wages and 
lack access to more traditional consumer loans that offer better interest 
rates, such as credit cards or personal loans from banks. 
To try to deal with the creation of so many unregistered fintech lenders, OJK 
sent the list to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
(Kominfo), which responded by sending instructions to licensed Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) to block the IP addresses of these unregistered apps. 
Kominfo also requested that Google remove these apps from the Google Play 
Store.19 From July 2018 to April 2019, OJK has blocked 947 mobile apps.Nearly all of these apps 
20  were operating as fintech payday lenders. Table 6 displays the series of blocked apps during 
July 2018 to April 2019.
Table 6. 
Number of Blocked Apps, July 2018–April 2019
21
1          27 July 2018 222 (previously 227)  
2          7 September 2018              182
3          13 February 2019              231
4          14 March 2019              168
5           28 April 2019                          144
            Total                                              947
Release Date from OJK # of Fintech BannedNo
OJK also sent the list of illegal fintech lenders to the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), but unlike 
accepting deposits (considered illegal banking), lending money is not a crime. Because fintech 
lending merely matches borrowers with lenders (even when they are super-lenders), POLRI and 
the Attorney General’s Office have no authority over unlicensed money lending activities.
As of the July 2018 release, OJK had discovered that more than 100 unlicensed P2P lending 
providers in Indonesia were developed by Chinese firms, at least half of the 227 lenders they had 
identified (Aisyah, 2018). In December 2018, OJK issued a statement that out of roughly 400 apps 
19 The segment of the population targeted by unregistered payday loan apps is much more likely to own an Android-based phone, 
as iPhones are normally not affordable to poor Indonesians.
20 Five apps were blocked in error. 
21 Previously 227, but later 5 excluded because they were found to be licensed financial institutions. 
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that had been closed down in July and September, the majority were from China (CNN Indonesia, 
2018). 
The high number of apps being shut down could mask a much smaller number of actual companies 
operating these apps—a single firm may develop multiple lending platforms. This appears to be 
the case for at least some firms. For example, a developer named Xinhe had uploaded at least 
nine P2P lending apps to the web and Google Play Store, and other developers with Chinese 
names such as LiChen, Tupulian, Xiehualei also established lending apps with Indonesian names 
such as Dompet Pinjaman (loan wallet), DompetKamu (your wallet) and Duit Instan (instant cash).
At the next round of app closures in February 2019, the illegal foreign fintech services operating 
in Indonesia were mostly from China, Russia, and South Korea, according to the OJK Investment 
Alert Task Force. But they are not overwhelmingly Chinese—the chief of the task force, Tongam L. 
Tobing, reported that 23 of 231 fintechs that were forced to stop their activities during January-
February were Chinese firms (Dwinanda, 2019).
In March 2019, the OJK Investment Alert Task Force reported that out of 803 fintech lenders 
blocked (by that time), further analysis of their IP locations showed that the country of origin of 
323 (40%) were not identified, while 178 companies (22%) were from Indonesia and the rest (38%) 
were from various jurisdictions, including China, Singapore, Russia, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. 
Of course, analysis of the server location based on IP addresses is not a reliable indicator of 
the country of origin. Many companies operating in Indonesia can be owned and operated by 
foreign nationals, including Chinese controllers, either directly or through nominee arrangement. 
However, it is safe to conclude from OJK’s analysis that at least half of the apps have been owned 
and operated by Chinese-linked companies. Taking into account that almost all blocked apps 
were conducting payday loan activities, and OJK’s assessment of the registered payday loan 
businesses, it is clear that this sub-sector of fintech lending is largely operated by Chinese-
controlled companies.  
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THE IMPACT OF CHINESE CAPITAL ON INDONESIAN 
FINTECH DEVELOPMENT
A. General Perception on the Impact of Chinese Capital in Indonesian 
Fintech from a Market Perspective 
Indonesia’s fintech growth since 2016 and its rapid market adoption since 2018 are undoubtedly 
fueled by funding from China—exponential growth in e-payments and online lending cannot be 
separated from investments by companies connected to China. The development of Indonesian 
companies also mirrors that of China’s earlier digital path. Similarities include:
• Focus on transactions through payment facilitation and the extension of various 
financial products built on top of the platform (from loan, insurance, and wealth 
management), mirroring the Chinese models of Alibaba or Wechat and contrary to 
the more prominent use in the U.S. of advertising-based businesses like Facebook 
or Google22 ; 
• Strong emphasis on the online-to-offline (O2O) model, in which a mobile phone 
is used for physical payment (for example, for QR-based payment) or brick-and-
mortar outlets or individual agents facilitating online transactions that eventually 
bridge Indonesians without mobile internet access; and 
• The emergence of “super-apps” to aggregate different services—again mirroring 
Alibaba or Wechat, in contrast to the more fragmented services and products, in 
which consumers still prefer to use different apps to perform different transactions/
functions, prominent in the United States.
In 2017, Adrian Li, a reputable venture capitalist, argued that three metrics in particular reveal 
that Indonesia is a lot like the China was in 2007/2008: “e-commerce as a percentage of retail 
sales (1.4 percent in 2015), Internet penetration (28 percent in 2015) and GDP per capita ($3,834 
in 2015.) The economy grows about five percent annually, e-commerce is expanding rapidly 
(by $10 billion a year and forecast to hit $130 billion by 2020), and smartphone use is forecast 
to swell to 100 million by 2020. All that, coupled with weak infrastructure and poor logistics 
systems, makes it an especially big opportunity for e-commerce growth.” (Li, 2017)
Another reason the Chinese model works better for Indonesia compared to the U.S. model results 
from the revolutionary impact of mobile internet on daily activities. In China (2007) and Indonesia 
(2016), the rise of the digital economy coincided with the growth of mobile internet penetration, 
and therefore changing habits to incorporate mobile internet use is relatively easy. By contrast, 
in the United States consumers had internet access before the rise of smartphones, so “the 
landscape was pretty much set when iPhone was introduced: Facebook in social, Twitter in news, 
Google in search and Amazon in e-commerce.” (Zhao, 2019)
22 Amazon is the exception, rather than the rule. 
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For this reason, Chinese investments and technologies are perfectly suited to support the growth 
of Indonesia’s digital aspirations. They understand the Indonesian market better and may be able 
to replicate the formula that produced Chinese success with some degree of adaptation for the 
Indonesian market. 
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B. Public Anger Directed Towards Fintech Payday Lenders Associated 
with Chinese Operators
As discussed in part B of this paper, the rapid development of the fintech industry has 
left Indonesian regulators catching up to a more adaptable industry, and this leaves 
regulators reacting to the industry as it innovates to meet consumer needs rather 
than trying to anticipate consumer needs and control the industry’s development. 
In many ways, this catching-up by regulators feeds into public perception that 
fintech lenders, and especially Chinese fintech lenders, are bypassing, ignoring, or 
undermining Indonesian regulations. 
One of the key complaints raised by consumer groups is the feeling of that existing 
personal data protection systems are inadequate to govern fintechs and this has led 
to data abuse by the majority of fintech payday lenders. Many fintech payday lenders 
used the borrower’s contact data to call close relatives without the consent of the 
borrower or the borrower’s relative, for repayment. 
These collection calls were problematic not only because of how the data is used, but 
because of the behavior of the debt collectors. In early January 2019, the cybercrime 
unit of POLRI arrested three employees working for a Chinese-owned fintech payday 
lender called V-Loan. They were charged with committing threats and persecution 
during debt collection calls. The owner of the company, a Chinese national, fled 
Indonesia and has not since resumed business operations in Indonesia.
During July through December 2018, there was a series of protests and mass rallies throughout 
urban cities in Indonesia attacking fintech payday lenders for improper behavior. Most of these 
protests were addressed to fintech lenders not registered with OJK, although a handful of 
registered fintech payday lenders were also the targets of public protests. In December 2018, the 
Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), a reputable legal assistance organization in Indonesia 
compiled a list of violations committed by fintech payday lenders specific to personal data abuse:
• Access to sensitive personal data in the mobile phone (including contact list);
• Reach out and make call to any person in the borrower’s contact list, without the 
borrower’s consent; and
• Threats and persecution during debt collection calls.
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The Indonesian Consumer Watch (YLBHI), a reputable NGO on consumer affairs, recorded 234 
consumer complaints about fintech lending—all of which regard payday loans (Reily, 2019), 
while as of February 2019, YLBHI has received more than 3,000 complaints about payday lenders 
(Heriani, 2019). 
In February 2019, a local taxi driver committed suicide after failing to repay his debt and being 
chased aggressively by fintech payday lenders and their debt collectors. An investigation by OJK 
showed that he had borrowed from more than 10 fintech apps, most of which were unregistered 
apps, allegedly Chinese-owned. The authority could not make direct attribution which app caused 
the victim to commit suicide. 
In response to the growing concerns over personal data abuse, on 12 February 2019 under OJK 
Fintech Lending Department Director Letter No. S72/NB/13/2019, OJK issued a decree that 
restricts fintech lenders’ access to mobile internet data, save for: 
(1) Microphone; 
(2) Camera; and 
(3) Location. 
OJK requires all fintech companies to be audited under the framework of ISO: 27001 and found 
in compliance in order to be eligible for full operational licensing. This move is more restrictive 
than the previous letter issued on 17 October 2018 which prohibited access to “contact lists” and 
“other data unrelated to credit assessment.” The Indonesian Fintech Lenders Association (AFPI), 
however, demands the right to also access app histories and call logs.
There are valid reasons for fintech lenders to challenge the OJK directive. As discussed in the 
first part of this paper, Indonesia has a weak credit reporting structure and its national ID system 
has not stopped widespread identity fraud. Providing consumer loans is therefore extremely 
risky because it is difficult to learn with whom a lender is dealing and their creditworthiness. 
Contact list assessment is one of the way that fintech lenders have developed to perform this 
assessment in the absence of a developed credit report or trustworthy identification system. 
For example, fintechs are able to analyze communication patterns to learn a great deal about 
someone who has applied for a loan. However, none of these reasons justify harassment and 
bullying of consumers or those on their contact lists, and this behavior violates both the ethical 
and legal use of personal data. 
There is no direct relationship between the fintech operator’s country of origin and its likelihood 
to commit privacy violations, but several factors feed the popular perception that it is the result 
of foreign, and specifically Chinese, involvement. The following three issues in particular have 
shaped the perception by regulators that China-linked companies not only contribute directly to 
the problems with payday lending in Indonesia but also risk inspiring other companies to employ 
abusive tactics to secure their financial interests:
• All consumer complaints about fintech lenders are about payday lenders. This is 
in part because higher value loans cater to more sophisticated market segments, 
such as SMEs, more wealthy borrowers, and the socio-entrepreneurs serviced by 
microfinance;
• Most fintech payday lenders (both registered and unregistered) are Chinese-
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controlled;
• Despite high media coverage and public outcry (including a series of public protects 
by and for “fintech victims”), OJK so far has sanctioned only one registered company: 
Rupiah Plus (now Perdana), which is owned and operated by a Chinese national, and 
POLRI has made an arrest for online harassment to only one unregistered company: 
V-Loan, also owned and operated by a Chinese national. 
At the end of the day, despite public concern about them, Chinese fintech operators are not 
particularly adept at bypassing Indonesian regulations. Even exploitation of regulatory gaps 
is not a core feature of Chinese fintech operators, except when it comes to personal data and 
customer protection in fintech payday loans. 
The business model for payday loans regardless of the origin of their control, on 
the other hand, does exploit the existing regulatory framework, which was not 
originally designed to govern payday loans. High interest rates, a lax approach to 
personal data protection, and aggressive debt collection are closely associated 
with fintech payday lenders. It happens that the majority of fintech payday lenders 
are linked to China, but there is no evidence that their poor behavior is the result 
of their Chinese connections and not the business that they’re in. However, the 
connection has been enough to cause public outcry and consequences for Chinese-
linked firms. 
There are certainly gaps in the regulatory environment in which fintech payday 
lenders operate that these companies have exploited in terms of data and consumer 
protection. But the actions of fintech payday lenders have alerted OJK, which has 
been keen to close those gaps. This is not evidence of failure, but evidence that the 
system addresses the concerns of consumers as service providers adapt to meet 
their rapidly evolving needs without restricting their choices or stifling innovation 
by blocking Chinese or other firms from the market without sufficient evidence. As 
such, there is no reason to believe that democratic or governance systems have 
been corroded by Chinese fintech operators in Indonesia.
B. Governance Challenges in Fintech Lending
Ever since the 1998 financial collapse, the Indonesian financial regulators (BI and OJK) have 
been focusing on detailed and specific regulations on financial prudence and market conduct. 
On one hand, this creates high barriers to enter into the Indonesian financial services sector. On 
the other hand, it also led to a large segment of the market not properly served. Since the fintech 
lending regulation was introduced in 2016, the requirements for fintech have been somewhat 
more open, but regulators have been expected to tighten the rules to be at par with the banking 
regulations. In addition, the open nature of the digital space further exacerbates the difficulties 
of controlling the entry and imposing barriers to the fintech market. 
Below is the list of governance challenges that have been ill-used by the fintech payday lenders:
• Minimum guidance on interest rate, pricing transparency, and disclosure standards;
• Minimum guidance on data protection;
• Minimum guidance on debt collection standards;
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• Insufficient credit information institutional governance to facilitate data sharing to 
minimize credit risk; and 
• Free nature of market entry and almost zero barrier to market, with app store such 
as Google Play Store or Apple Store that act as “gate-keeper” to determine which 
application can be accessible to the consumers or not.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Indonesian digital financial market is growing exponentially, led by local and regional 
unicorns and independent tech entrepreneurs. This growth is happening most rapidly in two 
areas: e-payments and online lending. Chinese and Chinese-linked companies have been 
backing this growth through capital investments in and strategic partnerships with these leading 
companies. Some have attributed these capital investments to the similarity between Chinese 
and Indonesian markets being interpreted as an opportunity by Chinese opportunities to apply 
their knowledge from the Chinese experience to the Indonesian market. 
In most cases, consumers enjoy the benefits that have come from fintech innovation. Retailers 
now have the ability to use digital payments at a lower cost than credit card payments, consumers 
who once lacked access to credit can now find willing lenders, and general financial consumers 
have more options for financial products. 
This paper found no evidence of a link between Chinese fintech investors or operators and the 
Chinese government. Instead, each sub-sector of fintech has different levels of investment 
and control by Chinese investors, whether Chinese technology giants or independent Chinese 
investors. However, Chinese technology giants are predominantly found in e-payment, either as 
strategic investors in unicorns or as direct operators, arguably because e-payment is a capital-
intensive business and only a few companies can compete in the market as it exists. 
As is the case of many sectors (such as ride-hailing, hospitality, and  fintech) and in many other 
jurisdictions, the key success factor of fintech has been about “creative compliance” with existing 
regulatory regimes in order to drive innovation and push the boundaries of what is permitted 
by law, but also to invent new ways of interpreting the regulatory environment to pursue their 
commercial objectives. 
There is one area of fintech that has received completely negative coverage, not only from 
regulators but also from tech communities for the reputational damage they have caused to 
the whole industry: the area of payday lending. Payday lending grants micro consumer loans 
of up to $140 disbursed in cash with repayment in full at the end of the month. These lenders 
charge ultra-high interest rates, up to 2% per day, prompting discussions about how to reduce 
the maximum interest rate. Some consumers of these loans borrowed from too many lenders, 
lenders failed to effectively screen for creditworthiness in their customers and failed to clearly 
disclose all penalties for delayed payments. This combination harmed some less aware 
customers in Indonesia.
Many payday loan operators acted unethically, but the fact that this sector is dominated by 
Chinese-owned or controlled companies is incidental and not the explanation for these practices. 
Hundreds and thousands of consumer complaints have been lodged to consumer organizations, 
legal aid, and regulators to report these practices of fintech payday lenders. 
The remaining gaps in data and customer protection have breached ethical standards with tragic 
individual consequences. In response, the Indonesian government is working to fill these gaps. 
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This is not evidence that the system is broken, but that it is working. What remains crucial is 
that the regulatory environment is meant to facilitate the growth of the fintech sector instead of 
stifling it along the lines of the existing limitations for the traditional financial service institution.
As such, in terms of policy recommendations, consumer protection can be further advanced if 
the governance gaps are properly addressed. Rules on pricing transparency, data protection, and 
debt collection are emerging gradually to respond to the regulatory demands. The enforcement 
of these rules, however, will not be straight-forward considering any non-compliant firms can 
still offer their products and reach any consumer in the current structure of open digital market. 
Long-term institutional reform is therefore crucial, such as the development of a robust credit 
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